【大紀元3月12日訊】「中國模式」，史無前例？
中國的現狀日益引人矚目。關於所謂「中國模式」，眾說紛紜，人言言殊，以致中國的真相簡直就成了那黑澤明小子導演的「羅生門」，撲朔迷離，有多少論者就有多少個「中國」。
美國輿論重鎮《華盛頓郵報》曾發表詹姆斯‧曼（James Mann ）的文章：題為「中國的挑戰：無自由的耀眼致富模式」（THE CHINA CHALLENGE：A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty）。作者聲稱，中國的發展模式是對自由民主模式未來的新挑戰，並且贏了。他說：「對全球竭力抓牢自己權力不放的威權主義領導人而言，中國越來越適合當作藍圖。我們習慣於把中國當作一個經濟奇蹟，但它也變成了一個政治模式。北京已經顯示，他們不必在權力和利潤之間作出選擇；他們可以二者得兼。今日中國展示，一個政權能夠鎮壓有組織的反對派，而不需要透過選舉來確立合法性；一個執政黨可以維持對信息和互聯網的相當大程度的控制，而不會放緩經濟增長。並且它顯示一個國家的精英可以被舒適公寓、賺錢機會和個人的重大陞遷以及非政治性自由（服裝、娛樂、性、海外旅遊）所買斷。」
詹姆斯‧曼先生是一位中國問題的資深學者和作家，1984-1989年曾任洛杉磯時報駐北京辦事處主任，寫過諸如《北京吉普》等幾本有關中國的著作，現在在著名的霍普金斯大學國際戰略研究中心任駐校作家。應當感謝他的點撥，使我們知道，中國終於創造了一個獨步古今的非凡模式，傲視全球。看來上蒼確是偏愛中華，要另立新規律了。
然而，保守固執的我輩仍想深究：中國模式，果真如此異於他國，震爍古今？它果真如此難於理解，無法用主流的經濟政治學說解釋？所有過去人們所稱的普遍人性，在這裡統統失效？
讓我們來傾聽歷史的迴響。當我們退回幾十年，我們會聽見希特勒、斯大林等諸多統治者在其鼎盛期的演講，他們都曾強調自己民族、國家及其道路的獨特性，蔑視西方主流的經濟政治學說和制度模式，都認為自己開天闢地，走出了一條成功的、獨一無二的全新道路，開創了歷史。譬如，在1933年上任後第三天，希特勒就發表《告德意志國民書》，闡明德國不同於英法美的獨特的（反西方）民族性格，申明第三帝國的獨特道路。
的確，中國的經濟增長快速。但是，認為「中國現象」是「只此一家，別無分店」，在歷史上獨一無二，是否過於誇大其詞了？
上世紀前蘇聯的經濟，從30年代初到50年代一直維持高速增長，它那時的GDP增速比中國現在的增速還要高。認為蘇聯的共產制度開創了人類嶄新的生活方式東西方評論家，比比皆是。而德國的希特勒則聲言他要「拯救德意志農民，維持給養和生存基礎！拯救德意志工人，向失業展開一場大規模的全面進攻。」他的確創造了消滅失業的經濟奇蹟，倒1938年德國失業率僅為1.3%，而同期美國、英國、比利時、荷蘭的失業率分別為1.89%、8.1%、8.7%和9.9%。從1932年到1938年，德國的國民生產總值增長了102%，國民收入增長了一倍。德國在上世紀三十年代的經濟，呈急速膨脹，令世界瞠目結舌，憂懼交加。而南韓、台灣，在軍政府統治或戒嚴狀態下，從上世紀六十年代末至八十年代，經濟起飛神速，在在令國際社會眩目不已。
上述這些國家與地區，當年政權與當下中國政權一樣，都是非民主政權：或是極權主義，或是威權主義，因此，都鎮壓有組織的反對派，並且不需要透過選舉來確立合法性。它們與中國一樣，不必在壟斷權力和經濟增長之間作出選擇，而是二者得兼。然而，幾十年後，歷史的判決如何呢？蘇聯、納粹德國，這些非凡的挑戰自由民主的模式，現在到哪裏去了呢？南韓、台灣當年的經濟起飛式的威權主義，而今安在哉？統統煙消雲散了，它們已經化為歷史塵埃。作為當年「獨步古今的非凡模式」，而今統統皈依了平凡普遍的自由民主模式。
縱觀歷史，環視全球，在中國發生的此類專制下的經濟增長，即所謂中國的「獨特」模式，稀罕之處何在？何以能被誇張為難於理解的歷史性「奇蹟」？
「五大自由」：中產滿足？
詹姆斯‧曼論及中國城市精英目前已獲得的「五大自由」：衣著的自由，購買所需品的自由，出國觀光的自由，有婚外情事的自由，投資和獲利的自由。他們瀟瀟灑灑，逍遙自在，看起來比羅斯福給的「四大自由」還多。有鑒於此，精英們似乎心滿意足，無復他求了。因而詹姆斯‧曼說；「在中國，中產階級支持或至少符合現有政治秩序；畢竟，這種秩序讓中產階級走在前列。」這一觀察，就目前現狀而言，大體不錯。這些中產階級的境遇與心態，就像前蘇聯勃列日涅夫時代後期的精英們一樣。既然「五大自由」基本上都有了，汽車洋房，燈紅酒綠，衣食無憂，難道還有什麼不滿意的嗎？
據此，詹姆斯‧曼嘲諷克林頓、布什和布萊爾：「在1997年，克林頓總統說中國站在『歷史錯誤的一邊』，他預言，正如柏林牆不可避免倒塌一樣，（在中國）政治變革也將會降臨。布什總統也多次重複同一主題。他曾說：『同中國的自由貿易，時間是在我們一邊。』英國首相布萊爾兩年前說，他認為中國有著一股不可遏制的導向民主的動力。不。並非如此。」
然而，詹姆斯‧曼先生果真有什麼堅強理據，可以如此斷然否定上述西方政治家的判斷及預言呢？記得二十多年前，眾多的西方的克里姆林宮學的專家也是這樣嘲諷里根總統關於推倒柏林牆的呼籲的。這些學者當時看到蘇聯共產黨雖然經歷種種危機，但仍然長期控制政權的持久能力以及作為超級大國的諸多成就，特別是耀眼的國防力量，他們已經把共產國家的存在看作永恆不變的既成事實了。因而，不少西方學者視里根為昧於現實的白癡。
但歷史並沒有嘲諷白癡里根，反而給了這些專家們一個大大的尷尬：1989到1991年的蘇東巨變，迫使幾乎所有的此類西方專家們遍地亂爬，尋覓被跌破的眼鏡。
眾所周知，前蘇聯並不是被外部的武力進攻所打敗的，它是被它自己打敗的，是被自己的人民所拋棄的，其中的關鍵力量之一，正是那些看來滿足現狀的「精英」。為什麼？前蘇聯的這群「精英」何以最後成了大帝國崩潰的重要推手呢？原因無它，這是長遠利益的槓桿推動所致。從根本上，像蘇聯和中共這種反智類型的壟斷權力的政權，本性上就不相信「精英」，本性上就不能善待自己的同胞。即使是對經濟「精英」和知識「精英」也一樣。是的，精英們可以一時被舒適公寓、賺錢機會和個人的重大陞遷、非政治性自由（服裝、娛樂、性、海外旅遊）所買斷，但他們不可能永遠在公權力機構中沒有自己的代表，不能長久變成無聲的人，不能永遠是聾子和啞巴。（而在「黨中央」方面，分一杯羹給你可以，但絕不允許你分享或染指關鍵性的壟斷權力。）長此以往，精英們固然酒醉飯飽，卻仍然寢食難安。蓋因朝中無人，他們的利益得不到保障，隨時可能被權力當局根據自己的政治需要，予取予奪。他們的利益，離開制度性的保障，猶如空中樓閣，根基不穩，缺乏安全感，沒有長遠性。
君不見，那些中國富豪榜上的精英，已經有多少身陷囹圄，或亡命天涯？就以2002-2003年來說，部份民營企業家們就紛紛中箭落馬。《福布斯》富豪榜的第二富豪楊斌被捕受審，第三富豪仰融逃亡美國，明星富婆劉曉慶進駐秦城，開明儒商孫大午身繫囹圄……人人惶恐終日,不少企業家並悄悄設法從《福布斯》的富豪榜上除名，以策安全。
何以笑容可掬地「歡迎資本家入黨」的中南海當局有時會突然變臉？
筆者曾分析過個中微妙：時不時地，北京之所以從「官商合流」轉向「殺雞儆猴」，一為充實被銀行爛賬淘空了的國庫，二為平抑日益加深的貧富鴻溝導致的民怨。「一石二鳥」，何樂不為？反正高官子弟富豪絕不會被損及毫毛的。至於民間企業家呢？對不起，借用毛澤東在文革後期拋棄造反派時語言，「現在是你們犯錯誤的時候了。」雖然每個人的情況各不相同，但總體上並不影響民營企業家琅襠入獄的這一驚人現象的真實性。
仰人鼻息，無制度保障，縱然坐擁金山銀山，隨時都可能轉眼化成海市蜃樓。中產階級也好，精英階層也罷，以它們的精明，不可能看不到自己的長遠利益的。一時的政治冷漠，不可能永遠掩蓋長遠的利益盤算和政治直覺。因此，在這個意義上，亞里士多德所謂「人是政治動物」確為千古不易之理。看看香港這個長期以來被世人慣稱作政治冷感的城市，在回歸大陸後是如何變成政治沸騰之都的，就不難明白箇中奧妙了。
外交成就，進入主流？
應當承認，在外交方面，北京當局近年來有所改進，是頗有斬獲的。正如詹姆斯‧曼所說：中國的模式「不僅給緬甸、津巴布韋、敘利亞和朝鮮等受孤立的國家，而且給美國的一些抵制民主呼籲的重要夥伴（埃及或巴基斯坦），給我們的鄰居古巴和委內瑞拉提供不斷的希望。」「（許多國家）越來越轉向北京。而且同情感常常是雙向的：中國在近年來幫助支持津巴布韋、蘇丹、烏茲別克斯坦、古巴和朝鮮。」
他描述的上述現象的確有一定的事實根據。如所周知，源遠流長的中國文明的重要特徵之一，就是其注意力長期聚焦於人際關係，並特別看重面子，強調「內外之別」，篤信「家醜不外揚」。在這套氛圍中熏陶出來的官員，要練就一套圓熟謹慎週到的外交技巧，並非太難的事，甚至可說是駕輕就熟。這方面，周恩來就是中共的巔峰代表，他締造和涵養了中共外交的基本手法與傳統。加上最近些年來，北京經濟起飛，比過去更有實力撒銀子買朋友，因此在外界看來，北京近年的外交似乎連連得手，風光十足。而美國則因為「管閒事太多」，似乎處處在挨罵。
但是，這種外交情勢，是否真正意味著北京創造了一個全新的、有吸引力的制度模式？北京是否已經拿出了一套足以同西方抗衡的價值理念，並代表了未來？以致使各國都心悅誠服，萬邦來朝？
人們不會假裝看不到北京的「夥伴政權」都是些什麼國家：緬甸、津巴布韋、敘利亞、北朝鮮、蘇丹、烏茲別克斯坦、委內瑞拉、古巴……。不用再數下去了吧。對這些「朋友」，我想，多數中國人也許都羞於啟口，遑論那些精英了。北京政權信誓旦旦要與之接軌的「國際社會」，就是這些國家？實話實說吧，在國際上，它們基本上都被稱為「失敗的國家」。雖然物以類聚，人以群分，理固其然。但北京畢竟還有一點「向上」之念，與這樣一批國際「人渣」為伍，恐怕連中南海內諸公自己也不好意思承認的。美國這個世界警察雖被人罵罵咧咧，但一到關鍵時刻、危急時刻，人們會發現，多數國家（甚至包括中國的小兄弟如被韓、越南等），仍要求助於美國，而非中國。
撕開花團錦簇的包裹，直抵中國處境的實質內核，一個基本事實必須正視：在1989年至1991年東歐與前蘇聯的共產主義大潰敗之後，從根本上看，北京政權在國際主流社會的汪洋大海中，其實是一個孤島，雖然是個龐大的孤島；其實是一個異數，雖然是個笑容可掬的異數。
有些東西，無論如何西裝革履，人模人樣，終究是沐猴而冠。
奴工事件，預示前景
中國問題的根子是在內部。作為資深中國問題專家，詹姆斯‧曼先生不會不知道山西黑窯奴工事件。這一非法販賣、拐騙甚至綁架兒童、少年，使之成為黑磚窯的奴工，被長期殘酷壓搾，被剝奪人身自由的事件，駭人聽聞，震動全國。它不是一天兩天之事，而是持續了好些年；它不是單獨偶發的事件，而是遍及全省，甚至侵犯外省的大面積事件。正如六四屠城，正如薩斯事件……，它們在在表明了中國的制度性失敗，表明了中國的向下沉淪。它所警示給我們的是應當重塑制度，構建真正保障公民生命權、自由權和財產權的憲政秩序。
詹姆斯‧曼應當明瞭，如果中國模式真有吸引力，如果北京真對自己的模式有信心，何須如詹姆士觀察到的「維持對信息和互聯網的相當大程度的控制」，何須要建立水潑不進的「金盾工程」，封鎖資訊流通？如果確實身為「贏家」，中共多數上層領導人何須把自己子孫及其財產送到「輸家」如美國等「制度過時」的西方國家，並取得其居留權甚至入籍？
北京當下的抵抗普世價值，包裝「成功模式」，不過是拖延時日而已。它目前營造自己是成功模式的法寶有二：一是封鎖信息，然後努力包裝，竭力向外宣傳推銷。二而是吸取前共產國家級其他專制政權垮臺的教訓，竭力彌補一切可能導致潰堤的漏洞，頭痛醫頭，腳痛醫腳，防患於未來，扼殺於搖籃。但就是不願根本改革制度。這種方式，導致不滿之民怨之水，越積越多，堤防越築越高，堤壩千瘡百孔，中共東堵西防，疲於奔命。今天他可能還有能力補漏，然一旦到了某日，瀕臨臨界點，則補不勝補，防不勝防，「按下葫蘆起了瓢」，堤防將全線崩潰也。
屆時，詹姆斯‧曼們將如何自我解嘲呢？
Myth of the “China model”
Chen Kuide
How Unprecedented is the “China model”?
China’s rise on the international stage continues to generate debate, in particular regarding the “China model” that is credited with this rise. But what is the “China model”? And indeed, what is the “real China”? The diversity of views on this subject brings to mind Akira Kurosawa’s famous film “Rashomon,” bewildering the observer with an apparent variety of mutually exclusive versions of China.
The Washington Post published an article by James Mann entitled “The China Challenge: A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty.” In his article, Mann pronounced China victorious with its “startling new challenge to the future of liberal democracy.” He continued:
For authoritarian leaders around the world seeking to maintain their grip on power, China increasingly serves as a blueprint. We’re used to thinking of China as an economic miracle, but it’s also becoming a political model. Beijing has shown dictators that they don’t have to choose between power and profit; they can have both. Today’s China demonstrates that a regime can suppress organized opposition and need not establish its legitimacy through elections. It shows that a ruling party can maintain considerable control over information and the Internet without slowing economic growth. And it indicates that a nation’s elite can be bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money, and significant advances in personal, non-political freedoms (clothes, entertainment, sex, travel abroad).
James Mann is a veteran China scholar and writer who headed the Beijing bureau of The Los Angeles Times in the late 1980s. He is the author of several books in China, notably Beijing Jeep and most recently The China Fantasy, and he is currently an author in residence at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Given his expertise and renown, Mann’s description of the China model as unprecedented and extraordinary in its aims and accomplishments is being taken very seriously. But I cannot dismiss nagging doubts over how trailblazing the China model really is.
History suggests a number of precedents to the China model. Several decades ago, dictators such as Hitler and Stalin, each at the height of their power, stressed their nations’ unique rejection of western democratic models of political and economic development. Hitler, for example, on the third day after taking office in 1933 issued a “Notice to the Citizens of Germany” in which he affirmed the Third Reich’s unique (anti-Western) national character, and its striking off on a path separate from those of England, France and the United States.
Even China’s rapid economic growth has not yet broken historical records. The Soviet Union maintained even more rapid economic growth from the beginning of the 1930s to the 1950s, while commentators around the world marveled at the new lifestyle that the Soviet system had apparently created for mankind. In Germany, Hitler declared that he would rescue German farmers and maintain their means of livelihood while simultaneously launching a massive all-out offensive to rescue workers from unemployment. He actually did resurrect Germany from its economic morass and virtually eliminated unemployment in Germany; in 1938, Germany’s unemployment rate was only 1.3 percent, compared with 1.89 percent in the Unites States, and levels ranging from 8 to nearly 10 percent in Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. Between 1932 an 1938, Germany’s GDP grew by 102 percent, and its national income likewise doubled. As in the case of today’s China, the rapid economic expansion of Germany in the 1930s was regarded with awe and trepidation, just as the burgeoning economies of South Korea and Taiwan under their respective authoritarian regimes dazzled the international community from the late 1960s into the 1980s.
Like today’s China, these totalitarian and authoritarian regimes suppressed organized opposition and spurned the opportunity to establish legitimacy through an electoral process. Like today’s China, they were not forced to choose between a monopoly on power and economic growth; they had both. But how has history judged them decades later? The Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, these extraordinary challenger of liberal democracy – where are they now? Like the authoritarian regimes that ruled South Korea and Taiwan, these extraordinary and unprecedented models have crumbled into the dust of history, while the countries they ruled with iron fists have all shifted back to the mainstream of liberal democracy.
Looking back at history, it is hard to see China’s current “miracle” as truly unprecedented, and likewise difficult to believe in its inevitable “triumph” over liberal democracy.
“Five Freedoms” and a Complacent Middle Class
James Mann noted five freedoms that China’s urban elites now enjoy: The opportunity to invest and make money, to buy and wear what they want, to enjoy themselves, to see the world and to have love affairs. These freedoms certainly have more sparkle and pizzazz than the four homely aspirations of the Roosevelt era. Appearances would suggest that China’s elite have nothing more to ask for, and as a result, Mann observes, “the middle class supports or at least goes along with the existing political order; after all, that order made it middle class in the first place.”
There is little to argue with in Mann’s description of China’s middle class, which in its situation and attitudes is reminiscent of the Soviet elite during the late Brezhnev era; with their access to the best cars, homes, food and clothing, what reason should they have for dissatisfaction?
It is the complacency of China’s middle class that leads Mann to discredit the apparently naïve predictions of western leaders that affluence might bring democracy to China:
In 1997, President Bill Clinton said China was on “the wrong side of history.” Political change would come “just as, inevitably, the Berlin Wall fell,” he predicted. President Bush has repeated many of these same themes: “Trade freely with China, and time is on our side,” he once said. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said two years ago that he thought there was “an unstoppable momentum” toward democracy in China. Not quite.
But are Mann’s arguments strong enough to categorically rule out the validity of these western politicians’ judgments and predictions? I recall that 20-odd years ago, many western Kremlinologists ridiculed President Reagan’s speech calling for the toppling of the Berlin Wall. These scholars had observed the Soviet Communist Party’s stubborn survival through various crises, and saw the Soviet Union, with its formidable defense force, as a permanent fixture among the world’s superpowers. To these experts, President Reagan was hopelessly out of touch with reality.
But it is not Reagan whom history mocked: the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991 left almost all of those western analysts and experts scrambling for a new theoretical foothold.
As we now know, it was not external forces that defeated the former Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union that defeated itself. It was abandoned by its own people, led to a significant extent by its apparently complacent elite. Why did this elite contribute to the collapse of an empire that had brought them so much personal benefit? Because these intellectuals and other elites recognized where their long-term interests lay. The Soviet Union, like Communist China, was a fundamentally anti-intellectual regime intent on monopolizing power, inherently unable to trust its cultural and economic elite.
Yes, the elite class can temporarily be bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money and significant advances in personal, non-political freedoms, but eventually elites will tire of their lack of representation in the public power structure, and their lack of voice and control over their own fates and interests. After all, if your benefits derive largely from the whims of the authorities, they can disappear just as quickly through the same whims. However comfortable their existence, the elites under a totalitarian regime know that their castles are floating on air without institutional support, and that lacking a stable foundation, they have no long-term future.
We’ve seen how many of those formerly listed among China’s wealthiest tycoons have already either been imprisoned or have fled into exile since being targeted by the Chinese authorities. Yang Bin, once listed second on Forbes’ list of Chinese tycoons, was arrested in 2002 on charges of tax evasion and was eventually sentenced to 18 years in prison. Yang Rong, once third on the Forbes list, fled to the U.S. in 2002 after being accused of economic crimes. Former movie star Liu Xiaoqing, who made a fortune in real estate, ended up in Qincheng Prison, and the enlightened Confucian merchant Sun Dawu has disappeared from public view after receiving a suspended three-year sentence for “illegally accepting deposits from members of the public.” Inclusion on the Forbes list is increasingly regarded as a kiss of death, and some entrepreneurs have been reported to have quietly requested to be removed from the list.
What leads the Zhongnanhai authorities to sometimes turn against the “red capitalists” to whom they have previously extended warm welcome? I suggest two main causes: 1) Beijing needs to confiscate the wealth of these tycoons in order to fill the huge gaps in the accounts of state-owned banks; 2) the government needs to acknowledge the grievances of China’s underprivileged regarding the growing gap between the rich and the poor.
The wealthy children of high-ranking officials, of course, manage to escape the noose, while even the most blameless private entrepreneurs can enjoy no feelings of security.
In an environment lacking constitutional guarantees of rights, and where bureaucratic whim can transform a golden mountain into a mirage, members of China’s wealthy elite and middle-class are forced to constantly reconsider their long-term interests. Under these conditions, political apathy cannot last forever, because only those with finely-honed political intuition will be rewarded. As Aristotle noted long ago, “Man is a political animal”; we have seen that even a place with a reputation for entrenched political apathy such as Hong Kong has become more embroiled in politics since reunification with the mainland. The reasons, I think, are self-evident.
Diplomatic achievements bringing China into the mainstream?
It should be acknowledged that Beijing has actually scored some significant diplomatic points in recent years. James Mann observes:
China’s single-party state offers continuing hope not only to such largely isolated dictatorships as Burma, Zimbabwe, Syria and North Korea but also to some key U.S. friends who themselves resist calls for democracy (say, Egypt or Pakistan) and to our neighbors of Cuba and Venezuela… Repressive regimes elsewhere are increasingly looking to Beijing. And often the sympathy flows both ways: China has, in recent years, helped to prop up Zimbabwe, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Cuba and North Korea.
There is much truth in Mann’s observations. Chinese civilization is well known for its focus on relationships and “face,” its emphasis on the difference between “insider” and “outsider” and on the need to maintain appearances. Chinese officials nurtured in this atmosphere naturally develop exquisitely fine-tuned diplomatic skills. Zhou Enlai represented the pinnacle of China’s achievement in this respect as he established and developed the CPC’s basic diplomatic practices. China’s economic boom has provided it with additional financial incentives to offer prospective allies, greatly enhancing Beijing’s image of diplomatic prowess at a time when the United States has gained an increasingly negative international reputation.
Does this diplomatic situation, however, really indicate that Beijing has created a new and attractive institutional model, or a new set of universal values to compete with those of democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law?
Let us be frank about exactly what image is created by the partnerships Beijing has formed with the regimes of countries such as Burma, Zimbabwe, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Cuba. I think it is fair to say that the majority of Chinese people would be ashamed to acknowledge these “friendships,” and the elite even more so. Is this really how Beijing plans to make China part of the “international community”? Everyone is familiar with the saying “Birds of a feather flock together,” and if China has any real aspirations on the world stage, it will need to extend its partnerships beyond rogue nations. In any case, while the United States is constantly criticized for acting like “the policeman of the world,” whenever a crisis develops, even China’s “little brothers,” North Korea and Vietnam, are more likely to turn to the U.S. than to China for help.
In the final analysis, the fact remains that since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the years 1989-1991, China has become an island, albeit a very large one, in the vast international mainstream. And it remains a deviant, for all that it is a smiling deviant, just as a monkey retains its basic nature, even if dressed up in a smart little tuxedo.
A nation of slaves
The crux of China’s problem is internal. As a veteran observer of China, James Mann is certainly aware of the recent Shanxi kiln slavery incident, which shocked and horrified China and the rest of the world with its revelations that migrant workers and many children and teenagers were through deception and abduction forced to work under horrific conditions at brick kilns in the backwaters of Shanxi and Hebei provinces. This was not a recent phenomenon, but one that had been ongoing for some years over a broad geographical expanse. This case, along with the June 4 massacre and the SARS incident, has exposed China’s profound systemic flaws and raises real questions about the fundamental nature of China’s rise. It alerts us to the need for China to reshape its system through a constitutional order capable of genuinely protecting basic rights of life, liberty and property.
If the Chinese government is confident that its model is really so desirable, why does it feel compelled, as James Mann observes, to “maintain considerable control over information and the Internet”? Why has it built its massive “Golden Shield” to block the flow of information from the outside world? If the Chinese have developed a winning system, why have so many CPC leaders jettisoned their offspring and assets to the “outmoded” systems of the United States and other western countries?
Beijing’s presentation of its “successful model” as a preferable alternative to universal human values merely delays the inevitable moment of truth. At present, China’s “successful model” is constructed from two main elements: first, China’s control of information and packaging of its image to the outside world, and second, the lessons China has learned from the collapse of the former Soviet bloc and other totalitarian regimes regarding the need to quickly plug every leak in the dike of social control, rapidly address every symptom of discord and nip all buds of unrest. The root systemic causes of popular discontent, meanwhile, are largely ignored. But a dike can only be built so high and requires constant upkeep. The danger remains that the floodtides of unrest in China will continue to rise faster than Beijing can build new levees, threatening a social deluge of Katrina-like proportions and even more lingering and far-reaching fall-out.
What then of this lustrous model of wealth without liberty?
Notes
1. James Mann’s article can be read in full at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/
18/AR2007051801640.html.
2. A full English translation of Hitler’s proclamation isposted at http://www.humanitas-international.org/
showcase/chronography/speeches/1933-02-01.html.
3. Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms,” outlined in aspeech on January 6, 1941, were freedom of expression,
freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedomfrom fear.
4. For themost recent Forbes list of “China’s 400 Richest,” see http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/74/biz_06china_
The-400-Richest-Chinese_land.html.
5. See “Yang Bin Convicted of Fraud, Sentenced to 18 Years, ”People’s Daily Online, July 15, 2003, english.peopledaily.
com.cn/200307/14/eng20030714_120183.shtml.
6. See “Yang Rong Sues Liaoning Government,” Epoch Times,August 19, 2003, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/
3-8-19/2607.html.
7. See “Actress Arrested for Tax Evasion,” Shanghai Star, August 1, 2002, http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2002/
0801/bz9-1.html.
8. See Qin Hui, “Two Tycoons, Two Fates: Zhou Zhengyi and Sun Dawu,”China Rights Forum,No. 1, 2004.
Date Posted： Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Keywords: James Mann China model
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